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Abstract

loader code, operating system, and web server software. Such TCBs could easily comprise millions of
lines of code.
The surface area of the problem may be reduced
in two ways. The first and most obvious solution is
to shrink the TCB, either by reducing the amount of
code required to perform the desired tasks, or reducing the amount of code which needs to be trusted.
The latter can be accomplished by utilizing hardware protections such as AMD SVM [5] and Intel
TXT [20], which effectively remove pre-operating system software and firmware from the TCB. ARM
TrustZone [3] partitions system code into “normal
world” and “secure world” code, ideally to exclude
the normal world code from the TCB. More recently,
Intel SGX technology [2] introduced a hardwareprotected execution environment to shield arbitrary
code (e.g. system or application code) from the rest
of the system.
The second solution is to increase the trustworthiness of code which must be a member of the TCB.
For instance, a program written in a memory-safe
language may be more trustworthy than a similar
program written in C. Stronger guarantees about the
trustworthiness of a program or system can be made
using formal methods. Substantial progress on producing partially or fully verified operating systems,
microkernels, and hypervisors has been made in the
past decade [17, 23, 27].
SABLE is a trustworthy secure loader which applies both of these solutions to shrink the platform
TCB and improve the trustworthiness of platform
software. A trusted boot loader performs a cryptographic measurement of program code and then ex-

We introduce the Syracuse Assured Boot Loader Executive (SABLE), a trustworthy secure loader. A
trusted boot loader performs a cryptographic measurement (hash) of program code and executes it unconditionally, allowing later-stage software to verify
the integrity of the system through local or remote
attestation. A secure loader differs from a trusted
loader in that it executes subsequent code only if
measurements of that code match known-good values. We have applied a rigorous formal verification technique recently demonstrated in practice by
NICTA in their verification of the seL4 microkernel.
We summarize our design philosophy from a high
level and present our formal verification strategy.

1

Introduction

The United States Department of Defense Orange
Book defines the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
of a computer system as the part of the computer
system “which contains all of the elements of the
system responsible for supporting the security policy and supporting the isolation of objects (code and
data) on which the protection is based” [15]. Hence,
on a typical x86 server the TCB or “trust boundary” would encompass the hardware, firmware, boot
∗ This research was supported in part by a subcontract
from Critical Technologies Inc., under United States Air
Force Research Laboratory (USAFRL) Information Directorate prime contract #FA8750 13 C 0152, based upon US
Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) topic #AF121-051, “Remote Attestation and
Distributed Trust in Networks (RADTiN)”
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ecutes it unconditionally. Later-stage software may
opt to verify the integrity of the system through local or remote attestation. A secure loader differs from
a trusted loader in that it executes subsequent code
only if measurements of that code match known-good
values.
Hence a secure loader must, by definition, prevent
the execution of untrusted code [30]. SABLE is able
to make this guarantee by utilizing the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [36] chip together with AMD
SVM on AMD platforms and Intel TXT on Intel
platforms. Via cryptographic hashing, the TPM can
“measure” code prior to its execution. Additionally the TPM may “seal” data to a particular system state, characterized by hash chain digests aggregated in secure storage [30]. By joining these two
paradigms, SABLE satisfies the definition of a secure
loader.
Moreover we employ formal verification techniques
demonstrated in practice during the seL4 verification effort [24]. In particular, we have implemented
SABLE in a manner which allows it to be translated into a monadic language that can be parsed
by a proof assistant. In this proof assistant, we construct an abstract specification of SABLE’s implementation, and prove that the implementation exhibits a subset of the behavior allowed by the abstract specification. This rigorous verification effort
thus increases the trustworthiness of SABLE when
compared against other trusted software which has
only been penetration tested.
We have implemented SABLE to run on both the
AMD SVM and Intel TXT architectures. From the
user’s perspective, the behavior of SABLE on either
architecture is identical. Though the implementation
details do differ somewhat, for brevity we focus our
discussion in this paper on SABLE’s implementation
for AMD SVM.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the relevant background in trusted
computing and formal verification. Section 3 outlines the design of SABLE and its bilateral attestation protocol. Section 4 describes the implementation of SABLE. Section 5 details the formal methods
used to verify SABLE’s implementation. Sections 6
and 8 discuss related work and the work remaining to

be done to fully formally verify SABLE, respectively.
Section 7 discusses our reflection on the design and
verification process.

2

Background

2.1

Trusted Computing

According to the Trusted Computing Group (TCG),
Trust is the expectation that a device will
behave in a particular manner for a specific
purpose. A trusted platform should provide
at least three basic features: protected capabilities, integrity measurement and integrity
reporting. [37]
SABLE serves as the software foundation for integrity
measurement and utilizes the protected capabilities
of the trusted platform. The following subsections
introduce these concepts. Integrity reporting may
be performed by the operating system or application
software which is outside the scope of this paper. Details about integrity reporting with the TPM can be
found elsewhere [11, 31, 37, 44].
2.1.1

Integrity Measurement

The TCG uses the term measurement to describe
a cryptographic hash operation [37]. Measurements
can, among other purposes, be used to verify the integrity of code/data or to attest to the integrity of a
particular system configuration. TPM chips contain
several Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
which store measurements in a digest. Measurements, however, are not written directly into a PCR.
Rather, they are extended into a PCR in the following
manner:
PCRi,n+1 ← H(PCRi,n || H(data))
where H is a cryptographic hash function, || is the
concatenation operator, and PCRi,n is the value
of the ith PCR after n extend operations on that
PCR [37]. Thus in each extend operation the current value in the PCR is replaced by the hash of the
old value of the PCR concatenated with the hash of
2

is sufficiently trustworthy (i.e. known non-malicious).
Then the client would use the SML to compute the
hash digest(s) in the same manner and sequence as
the server software and the TPM, and compare the
result(s) against the server’s quoted PCR value(s).
Assuming that the PCR values can be transmitted to
the client with verifiable integrity1 , these PCR values accurately characterize of the state of the server.
Thus the remote client is able to determine whether
or not the SML is an honest log of the server’s running software and firmware. A Linux platform which
uses this logging and reporting scheme was described
in [33].
In the TCG terminology, the boot protocol given
in Figure 1 uses a static RTM (SRTM) [37]. A SRTM
begins performing measurements as early in the boot
process as possible. For instance, on PC clients the
BIOS and firmware serve as the SRTM. The BIOS
must measure itself and extend the measurement into
PCR0. It must then measure ROM code and configurations, and initial program loader (IPL) code, then
extend the measurements into other PCRs [41]. The
IPL must then continue to maintain the trust chain.
Unfortunately, low-level software such as the BIOS
and UEFI are known to be susceptible to numerous attacks [8, 26, 43], and thus are not infrequently
compromised. Moreover these components may be
regularly updated, hence their measurements would
change over time. This could make it difficult to keep
track of which measurements are “good” and which
are “bad.” Even the SRTM model itself has been successfully compromised [10].
Another relevant concern to security experts is the
size of the TCB when the entire boot process is included. If all of the code which is executed after
power-on must be measured, then the entire system
is the TCB. This is not desirable. To mitigate, the
TCG has introduced a second form of RTM: “A dynamic root of trust for measurement transitions from
an untrusted state to one that is trusted” [37, emphasis added]. In other words, in order to minimize

Figure 1: Trusted boot execution [37]

the new data. Because the PCRs are shielded by the
TPM and a narrow command interface, they form a
root of trust for measurement (RTM) for the system.
The PCR extension scheme allows one to chain
hashes in a sequence of arbitrary length, e.g. as a
digest of system or process execution. The common
application of this technique to trusted boot is as
follows. Some initial component known as the core
root of trust for measurement (CRTM) measures itself and the next component to be launched [37].
These measurements are extended into a PCR by
the CRTM. The next component in turn measures
its subsequent component(s), etc. When the operating system or hypervisor is finally launched, it is
then responsible for measuring each program and extending that measurement into a PCR before forking
a process for that program. Figure 1 illustrates this
procedure. Odd-numbered steps indicate measurements, and even-numbered steps indicate the launch
of the next component.
Ideally, the OS/hypervisor would also store a more
verbose log of system execution, including the boot
components. For example, this log may contain the
name of each component/program, its version number, and its measurement. The TCG refers to this
kind of log as a stored measurement log (SML) [37].
A remote client could verify the integrity of a given
server by requesting the server’s SML and a signed
quote of the server’s PCR measurements. The client
would first verify that all of the software in the SML

1 TPM 1.2 provides the TPM Quote command [40], which
signs a set of PCR values using an Attestation Identity
Key (AIK) [37]. AIKs use Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) [9], which allows the AIK’s signature to be validated
without revealing the identity of the platform owner.
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the TCB, the root of trust for measurement should
be established as late in the boot process as possible. This is the goal of the DRTM, also called a late
launch [20].
Both AMD and Intel have implemented DRTM
support in their recent x86 architectures. AMD’s
DRTM technology is called Secure Virtual Machine
(SVM)2 [5], and Intel’s is Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [20]. These two implementations are
conceptually very similar. SVM provides a special
secure machine instruction, skinit, which triggers
the late launch. The analogous instruction on Intel’s
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) architecture is
getsec[SENTER].
In brief, skinit takes as an argument a Secure
Loader (SL), and extends its hash into a PCR. This
establishes the CRTM. The SL is then executed unconditionally in solitary confinement. During execution, all but one CPU core is disabled, global interrupts are disabled, hardware debugging is disabled,
and DMA is disabled [5]. The lone CPU core which
remains awake during an skinit is referred to as the
bootstrap processor (BSP). Whatever code was executed before skinit has no bearing on the execution
of the system after the skinit instruction has been
invoked. As a consequence the size of the TCB is
substantially reduced.
2.1.2

cure storage, binding and sealing, both employ the
SRK [36]. Performing a TPM Bind operation on some
data simply encrypts that data with the TPM’s private SRK. Since the SRK, like the EK, is effectively
unique to each TPM, in essence this binds the data
to a particular TPM, and thus a particular machine.
The functionality of TPM Bind is further enhanced
by TPM Seal. When data is sealed, it is both bound to
the platform by the SRK, and bound to a particular
system state, as given by a set of PCR values. The
TPM Seal command takes as parameters the data to
be encrypted and a set of PCR indices3 [30]. The
command outputs the cyphertext encrypted by the
SRK, as well as an integrity-protected list of PCR
indices and their corresponding values, as specified
during TPM Seal. Together, the cyphertext and PCR
list comprise an encrypted blob which may be passed
into the TPM Unseal command. The unsealing will
succeed if the PCR values given in the integrityprotected list match the actual PCR values at the
time TPM Unseal is called [30]. If all of the values
match, then the TPM uses its private SRK to decrypt the data.

2.2

Data Refinement

Despite the assurances provided by secure hardware
and penetration testing, these alone may not be sufficient for deployment in a security-critical setting. A
formalized, mathematical proof of a program’s correctness can be considered the strongest possible argument for that program’s trustworthiness. Until recently, formal methods proved infeasible in the verification of large and complex programs such as operating systems and hypervisors. An extensive overview
of the shortfalls and successes of verification efforts
in this area was cataloged by Klein [23].
Yet in recent years, the formal verification of
large-scale projects has become not only feasible,
but also time and cost efficient. The seL4 team
at NICTA prototyped, verified, and implemented a
high-performance microkernel in an estimated 20 per-

Protected Storage

In addition to measurement and integrity reporting
capabilities, the TPM offers protected storage capabilities. In particular, a small segment of protected
non-volatile memory is reserved for two notable keys.
The Endorsement Key (EK) is a key pair which is
pre-installed by the manufacturer; it is unique to each
TPM. When one takes ownership of the TPM, the
Storage Root Key (SRK) is generated by the TPM.
Neither of these keys may ever leave the TPM [36].
The EK is generally used for attestation purposes,
for instance to sign a report which lists the values
currently residing in a set of PCRs. Of greater relevance to the SABLE project is the role of the SRK.
3 The caller will specify whether (a) the data will be sealed
The two primary TPM mechanisms for providing se- to the values currently residing in the given PCRs, or (b) the
2 AMD

data will be sealed to some hypothetical PCR values, which
the user must also provide as part of the call.

has recently re-branded SVM as “AMD-V.”

4

son years [24]. Their final product has been proven
void of a number of common bugs and vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow attacks. Moreover the
seL4 microkernel’s performance is demonstrably on
par with that of several other high-performance microkernels in the L4 family [24].
The high-level verification technique used by the
seL4 team is known as data refinement [14, 25], which
can be summarized as follows. Define a concrete
event-driven system C in terms of its state transitions as it reacts to events, e.g.

transitions) does not exceed the bounds of the execution of A. One useful corollary to data refinement
is that any Hoare triple of the form
{|P |}λs. execution S s events{|Q|}
which is valid for A must also be valid for C.

3

SABLE Overview

The primary goal of SABLE is to facilitate mutual
trust between the user and his or her system. SABLE
establishes this trust by implementing a bilateral attestation protocol, which requires the user and system to exchange secrets during the boot. In order to
protect the secrets in memory, the bilateral attestation is performed after the DRTM instruction invocation, and within the trusted execution environment
set up by the DRTM instruction.
SABLE’s execution proceeds in three stages: prelaunch, launch, and post-launch, where the term
“launch” refers to invocation of the DRTM instruction. The pre-launch phase establishes communication with the TPM chip and enables the virtualization capabilities of the CPU required for DRTM. It
also stops all application processors, leaving only the
primary “bootstrap” processor running.
The launch phase invokes the DRTM instruction.
In AMD SVM, the DRTM instruction is skinit. In
brief, skinit performs the following operations:

StepC :: event ⇒ σC ⇒ σC set
We allow each state transition to produce a set of
output states so that we can model both failure (an
empty set) and non-deterministic behavior (a set with
cardinality greater than 1). Similarly, define StepA
over states σA for an abstract event system A. Finally
define a global “observable” state σG which ideally
should be a generalization of both σC and σA , such
that system initialization and finalization functions
InitS :: σG ⇒ σS set,
F inS :: σS ⇒ σG
respectively, where S ∈ {C, A}. To simulate a finite
sequence of steps, we define a stepping function:
steps δ s events
:= foldl (λevent states. (δ event) “ states)

• Reinitialize the CPU in the same manner as the
INIT signal.

s events
where R “ S is the image of S under the relation R.
Finally we define a function to execute the system,
beginning and ending in global state(s):

• Clear or reset all CPU registers except EAX and
EDX (which hold arguments for skinit), ESP,
and MSRs not related to security.

execution S s events :=

• Set up protections for the 64KB region containing the secure loader (SL), including protection from direct memory access (DMA), isolation
from the PCI configuration space, and isolation
from any component (e.g. a graphics card) using
GART-translated addresses.

F inS “ (steps StepS (InitS s) events)
Given the abstract system A and concrete system C,
we say that C refines A (denoted A v C) when
execution C g events ⊆ execution A g events

• Transmit the SL image to the TPM, which then
hashes the image and extends the hash into
PCR17.

for all initial globals states g and event sequences
events. Hence, the execution of C (in terms of state
5

• Clear the global interrupt flag, thus disabling all
interrupts.

user confirms, proceed to launch the next executable module. Otherwise, the access control
policy failed, and the TPM will deliver an error
code specifying which criteria (e.g. a bad PCR
value) was not satisfied; inform the user of the
error and exit.

Further details about the behavior of skinit can be
found in the SVM architecture reference [5].
Each v1.2 TPM chip has at minimum 24 PCRs [38].
PCRs 0-15 are generally used for the SRTM model.
When the system is reset, these PCRs are all reset
to 0. PCRs 17-22 are reserved for the DRTM model.
On system reset they are reset to −1. The only way
to reset these PCRs to 0 is to invoke a DRTM instruction. PCR17 cannot be extended by software; it
can only be extended by the CPU, e.g. via skinit.
Hence a non-zero, non-negative-one value in PCR17
can be taken as evidence that the DRTM instruction
was invoked on the system and in the current boot
cycle, and by the SL whose measurement matches the
value in PCR17.
The post-launch stage proceeds in one of two directions: configuration or secure boot. When performing a secure boot, SABLE does the following:

The configuration procedure is roughly the mirror
image of the secure boot. The user enters the necessary passwords and creates a pass phrase for the given
sequence of modules. SABLE measures the modules and seals the pass phrase to these measurements
and the measurement of SABLE itself, then finally
stores the sealed blob into a fresh TPM NVRAM index. We used the term SABLE-Enabled Configuration (SEC) to refer to a given sequence of modules
and a NVRAM index containing a secret bound to
those modules. A typical TPM 1.2 chip with 6KB
of NVRAM can support up to 18 SECs.

4

Implementation

1. Measure the additional boot modules that were
loaded by the generic boot loader that preceded Our approach to implementing SABLE was motivated by our intention to formally verify the imSABLE, and extend them into PCR19.
plementation after development, and after testing
2. Read a sealed blob from a TPM NVRAM index. SABLE on hardware. We did our original developThe blob contains an encrypted “pass phrase,” ment testing of SABLE in the QEMU x86 CPU emwhich can be interpreted by the user as evidence ulator, together with a software TPM emulator. We
that the boot components are valid.
modified QEMU to emulate the skinit instruction.
3. The user is prompted to enter two passwords, We later continued development on an AMD laptop
one to authorize use of the TPM’s storage root with SVM and a TPM 1.2, and then on an Intel lapkey (SRK), and another to authenticate the top with TXT and TPM 1.2.
In general, formally verifying a low-level language
user4 .
like C is difficult. Unsafe casting, bit fields, unions,
4. Issue a TPM Unseal command to unseal the blob
heap memory, pointer arithmetic, inline assembly,
containing the encrypted pass phrase. SABLE
and other similar features are difficult to model and
provides the measurements in PCRs 17 and 19
verify without subjecting the input to some reasonas well as the authorization passwords to satisfy
able constraints. For this reason, most of the (very
the access control policy on the sealed blob.
few) existing tools that can be used to verify C code
5. If the TPM Unseal operation succeeds, then the require that some proper subset of C be used.
access control policy was satisfied. Display the
The tool chain which we use to verify C code is
pass phrase to the user, who is then prompted built on top of the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant.
to confirm that the pass phrase is correct. If the Through a multi-step process, the tool chain translates the C input into another imperative language
4 The use of an additional password for the user is necessary
in the common scenario where several users may share access which can be understood by the proof assistant,
to the SRK.
and then abstracts this respresentation into a state
6

monad. The state monad representation allows us
to model imperative (stateful) programs in a pure
functional (stateless) proof assistant language. More
details on this process are given in Section 5.
This tool chain does enforce several constraints on
its input. For example, it will refuse to process string
literals. The obvious workaround was to use the C
preprocessor to strip away string literals before passing the source code into the verification tool. The
most limiting constraint of the tool chain is that it
mandates that local variables be local in a literal
sense. That is, local variables may not be passed by
reference (e.g. with an &) as an argument to a function. Without this constraint, the verification tool
chain would have to treat local variables as part of
the program state. This in turn would make it difficult or impossible to practically model and verify
recursive functions, for instance. Moreover, by treating local variables as strictly local, the they can be
safely abstracted into lambda-bound variables, which
are much easier to reason about than static or heap
data.
In situations where pass-by-reference semantics
would normally be desirable, we must instead adopt
one of two alternatives. The first alternative is to pass
locals by value. However, if the variables are large
objects or buffers, this can cause computational overhead. To make matters more difficult, SABLE must
fit entirely within a 64KB region of RAM. Minus the
code, heap, and data regions, we are left with only
about 8KB of RAM for the stack. So having multiple
copies of the same object simultaneously on the stack
should be avoided. And if an argument to a function
should be modified, this copy-by-value scheme will
not work, and the function may need to be substantially refactored.
The second alternative is to use pass-by-value semantics with (pointers to) heap-allocated data or
statically allocated data. In general, we use calls
to alloc() only when the size of a buffer cannot
be determined at compile time, e.g. when processing responses from the TPM. We statically allocate
data which could reasonably be considered a part of
SABLE’s state, rather than a temporary value.
The structure of the AutoCorres monad also forced
us to reconsider the way in which we handle hard-

ware errors and software exceptions. AutoCorres uses
the type (’a, ’s) nd-monad to model stateful computations. This is a synonym for the expanded type
’s ⇒ (’a × ’s) set × bool, where x is the Cartesian
product of types. That is, an AutoCorres monadic
computation takes an input state, and returns a set
of return value and result state pairs; hence monadic
computations can be non-deterministic. The Boolean
is a flag which, when set, indicates that a catastrophic
error—one which should never be triggered—has occurred, such as a failed assertion or a null-pointer
dereference. The monad can also model exception
throwing and handling with the addition of a sum
type: (’e + ’a, ’s) nd-monad. These computations
may yield either an exception of type ’e or a result
of type ’a. However, at the time of this writing the
AutoCorres tool cannot generate an abstraction of C
code to use this exception monad.
SABLE interfaces with multiple hardware components during its execution, including the TPM, CPU,
keyboard, display port, and PCI configuration space.
Any of these components may fail or emit error codes,
from which SABLE cannot always recover. Hence
SABLE should be allowed to fail gracefully by simply sending the shutdown signal to the CPU when
such an error occurs. Unfortunately, there is no
trivial way to model this behavior with the given
(’a, ’s) nd-monad construct. The failure flag is reserved only for catastrophic failures, which we must
prove the absence of. Hardware errors, on the other
hand, must be anticipated and either handled (e.g.
by retrying the operation) or should trigger a graceful shutdown.
Our approach was to implement SABLE to use
return-style exceptions, with considerable help from
the C preprocessor. For example, in Listing 1 we
have a function, read passphrase(), taken verbatim from the SABLE source code. The RESULT (T)
is a preprocessor-facilitated type constructor which,
given some type T, yields a type which can hold
either an exception or a value of type T. So
read passphrase() can either return (throw) an exception, or a value of type TPM STORED DATA12. The
driver function TPM NV ReadValue() can also throw
exceptions. When a function makes a call to a callee
and the callee throws an exception, the caller is
7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

static RESULT_ ( TPM_STORED_DATA12 ) read_passphrase ( UINT32 index ) {
const OPTION ( TPM_AUTHDATA ) nv_auth = {. hasValue = false };
RESULT_ ( HEAP_DATA ) val =
TPM_NV_ReadValue ( index , 0 , 400 , nv_auth , NULL );
THROW_TYPE ( RESULT_ ( TPM_STORED_DATA12 ) , val . exception );
return ( RESULT_ ( TPM_STORED_DATA12 )){
. exception . error = NONE ,
. value = u n p ac k _ T PM _ S T OR E D _ DA T A 1 2 ( val . value . data ,
val . value . dataSize )};
}

Listing 1: C implementation of read passphrase()

obliged by convention to either catch (and optionally
handle) the exception, or throw the exception to its
own caller. This latter behavior is typical in SABLE,
because most exceptions stem from hardware issues,
and thus must be fatal. The function in Figure 2 does
not know how to handle any exceptions potentially
thrown by TPM NV ReadValue(), so it simply throws
the exception to its caller. The THROW TYPE(T, e)
macro returns an exception of type T if e is an exception. If the call to TPM NV ReadValue() succeeds,
then read passphrase() returns the null exception
NONE, with the unpacked data structure containing
the passphrase data that was read from the TPM’s
non-volatile memory.

Abstract

AutoCorres

Simpl

C Sources

Isabelle/HOL

Figure 2: SABLE verification development cycle
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At the root of SABLE’s call graph is a function
which uses a CATCH ANY() macro to catch any exception which was thrown and uncaught during execution. It is this function which performs the graceful shutdown in the case of an uncaught exception.
This design also granted us one additional noteworthy benefit. Because SABLE runs on bare metal,
there is no operating system underneath to produce
and pretty-print stack traces in the event of a catastrophic failure. Our THROW() macros build a stack
trace by recording source code information at each
level of the call graph into a linked list. If the root
function catches an exception, it then pretty-prints
the call stack before the graceful shutdown. We often found this feature to be useful for debugging.

Formal Verification

All of our formal verification has been done in the
Isabelle/HOL proof assistant. Isabelle’s efficacy in
software verification has already been demonstrated
by the seL4 team [24]. Our verification process follows a strategy based on their approach.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the SABLE development and verification process. We developed
SABLE in an iterative process, gradually adding new
features to the C implementation and penetration
testing them. The effort to formally verify SABLE
is shown on the left side of the figure. White boxes
indicate layers of abstraction, and the green arrows
are correspondence proofs.
8

definition
NV ReadValue : : ” N V R e a d V a l u e i n ⇒
( ’ a N V R e a d V a l u e o u t ) tpm monad ”
where
” NV ReadValue com ≡ unknown ”

definition
read passphrase : :
” nat ⇒
( s t r i n g TPM. STORED DATA) E monad ”
where
” read passphrase i
≡ TPM NV ReadValue i 0 None”

Listing 2: Under-specified abstract specification of
TPM NV ReadValue

Listing 3: Abstract spec of read passphrase()
We use a parsing tool to translate the SABLE
source code into Simpl [34], an imperative programming language built into Isabelle/HOL. We then use
the AutoCorres tool [18] to automatically abstract
the Simpl code into a monadic representation with
an abstracted heap model [19]. Moreover, the AutoCorres tool automatically verifies the translation by
generating correspondence proofs for each translated
function, over each step of the translation process.
We produce the abstract, behavioral specification
of SABLE one function at a time. The abstract specification is minimal in the sense that it captures only
enough detail about SABLE’s behavior that is required in order to describe the security properties we
later hope to prove about SABLE. It is also nondeterministic, in that each abstract function may
transform one state and one sequence of inputs into
a set of (state × output) pairs. The proofs of correspondence between abstract specification functions
and AutoCorres-generated functions must be written
manually in the proof assistant.

5.1

The TPM itself is modeled with full nondeterminism. That is, the TPM’s state is not explicitly modeled; nor are its commands. The tpm monad
uses a unit (empty) state and an exception type lifted
from the TPM specification. When the TPM driver
invokes a TPM command, the command is lifted
into the caller’s monad, which does model CPU and
memory state. This separation implies that TPM
operations cannot affect the state of the CPU and
memory (including SABLE), except for the value(s)
returned by the operation. The unknown value in
Listing 2 models full non-determinism by returning
the universal set of values for the inferred type. In
this case, TPM.NV ReadValue will return an arbitrary
value of type (’a NV ReadValue out), where ’a is the
type of the value to be read, e.g. a string. Or,
TPM.NV ReadValue could return an arbitrary TPM
error, since tpm monad also models exceptions.
Functions in SABLE are modeled with greater determinism. The abstract specification of the SABLE
function which reads the passphrase from TPM
NVRAM is shown in Listing 3. It simply calls the
TPM NV ReadValue function, which is the abstract
representation of our C API function of the same
name. It takes the function parameters and marshals them into a buffer that is transmitted to the
TPM, then processes the response buffer and unmarshals the results, returning them to the caller. The C
implementation of read passphrase needs to perform
additional unmarshalling on the data returned from
the API call, but this modeling technique allows us to
abstract away these mundane details. The next section explains why this simplification does not violate
correspondence between the layers of abstraction.

Modeling SABLE

We use under-specification to model the low-level
operations performed by our TPM driver and the
TPM itself. Listing 2 shows the abstract specification of TPM NV ReadValue, the command which tells
the TPM to read data from a specified index in TPM
NVRAM. NV ReadValue in and NV ReadValue out
are record-style structures which describe the input
arguments and output values, respectively, to the
command. These roughly correspond to the command and response values described in the TPM
specification [40], but with low-level details, such as
parameter sizes, abstracted away.
9

{|P |} a {|Q|}

corres RS RR P P 0 ≡
λm m0 . ∀(s, s0 ) ∈ RS . P s ∧ P 0 s0
−→ (∀(r0 , t0 ) ∈ mResult (m0 s0 ).
∃(r, t) ∈ mResult (m s).
(t, t0 ) ∈ RS ∧ RR r (r0 , t0 ))
∧ ¬ mFail (m0 s0 )

corres
V

r

{|P 0 |} c {|Q0 |}

0
RS RR

P P0 a c

r0 . corres

RS RR
(Q r) (λs0 . r0 r (r0 , s0 ) ∧ Q0 r0 s0 ) (b r) (d r0 )

corres RS RR P P 0 (a >>= (λr. b r)) (c >>= (λr0 . dr0 ))

Figure 4: Correspondence splitting rule
Figure 3: Correspondence definition in Isabelle/HOL

5.2

Correspondence

For each function in the abstract specification,
we prove that it corresponds to the AutoCorresabstracted implementation function which it is supposed to model. Correspondence is a concept that
was first applied to verify seL4 [25]. It is similar
to the technique of forward simulation [14], except
that it can be recursively applied over monads using
a splitting rule. Both correspondence and forward
simulation imply data refinement [25].
Our definition of correspondence is similar to the
definitions used to verify seL4. It establishes a relationship between monadic functions in our abstract
specification and monadic functions generated by AutoCorres. The definition is given in Figure 3.
The m and m0 functions are corresponding monads
in the abstract spec and AutoCorres output, respectively. RS is a relation defined over abstract and
AutoCorres states and RR is a relation defined over
the monads’ return values. P and P 0 are preconditions which may constrain the input states and/or
monadic function arguments. Hence, the definition
states that for all input states s and s0 which satisfy the state relation and the preconditions, the following hold. First, for each possible output pair of
return value r0 and state t0 from the computation
m0 s0 , there exists a corresponding output pair r and
t from the computation m s such that the state relation holds for t and t0 and the return relation holds
for r and the pair (r0 , t0 ). Second, the AutoCorres
computation must not fail. The return relation must
also accommodate the AutoCorres state because a return value r0 may involve a pointer to a value on the
heap or in static memory; these are captured as part
of the AutoCorres state t0 . In our abstract specifica-

tion, there is no concept of a pointer.
All of our correspondence proofs follow a simple pattern. Given an AutoCorres-generated compound statement c >>= d and a compound statement a >>= b in the abstract specification, we apply
a splitting rule (Figure 4) which allows us to prove
correspondence separately for c and a, and then for
d and b. The >>= operator is a monadic bind for
(’e + ’a, ’s) nd-monad, which we described in Section
4.
Given abstract and AutoCorres-generated functions fA and fAC , respectively, we recursively apply
this splitting process to their ASTs, until we are left
with only atomic statements or nullary return statements, similar to no-ops. At this point, we unfold the
definition of correspondence for each pair of atomic
or nullary return statements, and use the proof assistant’s built-in theorem provers5 to automatically
discharge the proof goal. The most difficult part of
this entire process is choosing the correct preconditions P and P 0 for each splitting step.
Lemma 1 illustrates the typical format for one
of our correspondence proofs. This lemma establishes correspondence between the abstract specification of read passphrase() shown in Listing 3 and
AutoCorres-generated representation of the C implementation given in Listing 1:
Lemma 1. The abstract function read passphrase
corresponds to the generated read passphrase’:
∀i. corres (R STORED DATA rel string rel) > >
(read passphrase i) (read passphrase’ (of nat i))
Proof. By recursively applying the correspondence
splitting rule, and the definition of correspondence.
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5 We

use the Z3 [13] and CVC4 [7] theorem provers.

The R STORED DATA rel is a type-parameterized
relation defined over data of variable size stored on
the heap, in this case a string. Counterintuitively, the
input states and data do not require any constraints.
One might expect that the NVRAM index i should be
bounded according to the size of the TPM’s NVRAM.
We do not enforce this constraint because the value of
i is configured by the user, and thus may be invalid.
If the value of i is invalid, the TPM will return an
error. Thus our proof must demonstrate that both
abstraction layers will equivalently handle this error
if it is issued by the TPM. In other words, the precondition constraints must only preclude states and/or
input values which the functions in question should
not be expected to handle.
The correspondence splitting rule does not always
precisely fit a desired proof goal. For example, the
monadic definition of read passphrase is not compound (there is no >>= in the definition). However, the AutoCorres-generated read passphrase’ is
compound. To apply the splitting rule, we first apply one of the monadic identities to expand the noncompound expression into one that is compound:
f v ≡ (return v) >>= f
f ≡ f >>= return

(1)
(2)

In this example, we use the second identity rule. The
return corresponds to an additional unmarshalling operation performed by the read passphrase’.
The top-level lemma for SABLE proves correspondence for trusted boot(), the function which manages the bilateral attestation described in Section 3.
It directly calls read passphrase(), among other
routines:
Lemma 2. The abstract function trusted boot corresponds to the generated trusted boot’:
∀i. corres (λr (r0 , t0 ). RESULT rel r r0 ) > >
(trusted boot i) (trusted boot’ (of nat i))

6

Related Work

The first boot loader to implement the TCG platform
was Trusted GRUB [1]. Trusted GRUB is a patch

added to GRUB which hashes both GRUB and the
boot modules loaded by GRUB, and extends them
into one or more PCRs. Because Trusted GRUB is
built on top of GRUB, it has the advantage of being
able to load a wide variety of operating systems and
other system software. However, it is also encumbered by a fairly large TCB: the entire GRUB boot
loader.
The Open Secure LOader (OSLO) [22] attempted
to rectify this issue by using DRTM with a minimal
SL. Unlike Trusted GRUB, OSLO does not literally
load boot modules from disk. Instead, OSLO is itself loaded as a boot module (e.g. by GRUB). When
OSLO is launched it invokes the skinit instruction
to reset the CPU state, then it hashes the boot modules. Despite having “secure” in its name, OSLO is
in fact only a trusted loader because it will unconditionally launch the hypervisor or OS. It does not
validate any of the PCR values after measurements
after been taken.
The Trusted Boot (tboot) [4] loader, despite having
“trusted” in its name, is in fact a secure loader. Unlike OSLO, tboot supports the Intel TXT platform.
It achieves secure boot using a launch control policy
(LCP)6 [29], which allows execution to continue after DRTM invocation if and only if the PCR values
match the known good values specified by the launch
control policy.
None of the aforementioned loaders has been formally verified to any extent. To the authors’ knowledge, no other loader has been formally verified
to establish security properties. Das Barman and
Mukhopadhyay used a model checker to verify a communication protocol between two loaders used in the
A380 airplane. But their analysis was focused on
safety, not security [12].
The SABLE formal verification effort follows a similar process to that of the seL4 microkernel verification [24], with two noteworthy distinctions. First, the
seL4 team began by building a model “executable
specification” of seL4 in the Haskell programming
language, and testing it on a CPU emulator [16]. Second, the manual seL4 correspondence and refinement
proofs extend all the way down to the implementation
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6 LCP

is a feature that is only available on Intel TXT.

level. In verifying SABLE, we were able to use the
newer AutoCorres tool to first produce a monadic abstraction of the implementation, with automatically
generated correspondence proofs.
One other noteworthy project is Flicker [28].
Flicker is a minimal TCB which uses a DRTM instruction to allow user space processes to temporarily construct a trusted execution environment called
a Piece of Application Logic (PAL). Instead of invoking the DRTM instruction during boot, Flicker
invokes the instruction on demand from the operating system, and on behalf of an application. The code
running within the PAL is effectively given the same
hardware protections as SABLE.

7
7.1

Discussion
Minimizing the TCB

7.2

Verification Effort

Thus far, we have successfully proved correspondence for the most high-level functions in SABLE’s
call graph, those which manage SABLE’s bilateral attestation protocol.
This includes the
read passphrase() funtion describd in Section 4,
and the trusted boot() function, which is the root
of SABLE’s call graph after the DRTM instruction has been invoked. A sizable portion of the
work to verify correspondence for these functions
was dedicated to writing relations between types (including TPM structures) used by SABLE, and abstract representations of those types expressed in Isabelle/HOL. We also found it helpful to prove several
lemmas to sidestep boilerplate reasoning about those
relations. We have so far written 29 such relations
and 13 lemmas about them. Since many other functions in SABLE use these same types, we expect the
required effort for the remaining functions to be less
than it was for the functions already verified (e.g. in
terms of person hours per LoC).
The verification effort has so far entailed more than
400 lines of proof (LoP), and has not yet revealed any
bugs or vulnerabilities. However, it has prompted us
to refactor or rewrite each of the C functions we have
verified to clarify their behavior and make their implementation more concise. For instance, prior to
the verification effort we would often declare a structure, and then initialize its fields one-by-one. This
increased the complexity of the AutoCorres output,
and thus required us to make more splits in our correspondence proofs than were actually necessary. An
elegant alternative was to use the C99 [21] designated
initializer and compound literal features, which initialize a (possibly temporary) structure with its declaration. The NICTA C parser is aware of these
constructs, and AutoCorres treats them as ordinary
type constructors. We use both of these techniques
in read passphrase(), as shown in Listing 1.

The primary motivation of the x86 DRTM model is
to allow systems programmers to reduce the size of
the TCB[22]. Since trust and security do not depend
on whatever has executed prior to the DRTM instruction, we allow a generic and versatile boot loader (e.g.
GRUB or GRUB2) to perform most of the actual
boot loading. This entails reading the Master Boot
Record (MBR), loading the hypervisor and modules
into memory, and building metadata structures for
the loaded boot components. Many of the details of
boot loading are complex and low-level, and thus not
easily amenable to formal verification. Excluding this
code from SABLE and our TCB was thus desirable.
The exclusion of any and all unnecessary components from our secure loader makes it, by definition,
minimal. We only require the features which ensure
that our loader is secure, and that the operating system’s integrity can be verified. These features are
outlined above in Section 3, and they mostly involve
interaction with the TPM. SABLE’s implementation
currently contains just under 4,000 (LoC). By contrast, as of this writing GRUB2 contains roughly
300,000 LoC. Thus by adding SABLE to the TCB 8
Future Work
and removing GRUB2 from the TCB–and other components like the BIOS–we do substantially reduce the SABLE itself has no interesting security properties.
SABLE merely exchanges information with the user,
size of the TCB.
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and then interfaces with the TPM. This sequence of
steps and their significant aspects are captured by
the abstract specification, which is in turn refined
by the SABLE source code. However, if we reason about SABLE in conjunction with the TPM, the
CPU, and the PCI configuration space, then we can
begin to formulate meaningful security properties of
the system. We are currently planning to build a
rudimentary model of the TPM, sufficient to capture
the functionality required by SABLE. Only then can
we state and prove formal security properties, such
as “SABLE will allow the boot to proceed only if the
measured boot components have the correct SHA1
hashes, and the user enters the correct authorization
data.”
It may seem counterintuitive for us to focus lastly
on this verification step. But empirically the seL4
team has demonstrated that proving correspondence
is far more effective at identifying bugs and vulnerabilities than an analysis specifically focused on abstract security properties. For example, the seL4 correspondence and refinement proofs revealed 150 bugs
in their abstract specification, and 144 bugs in their
C source code [24]. The proofs that seL4 enforces integrity and authority confinement prompted no further revisions to either the abstract model or the C
source [35]. Our plan going forward is to work downwards through the call graph, until we reach functions
that are too dependent on hardware to reason about,
without modeling that hardware. We will simply assume correspondence for these functions. With these
correspondence proofs complete, we will be able to
prove the master theorem as a corollary:

update to any of the boot components thus requires
the SEC to be completely reconfigured. This is not
specifically a limitation of SABLE; it is a limitation
of the access control policies that can be applied to
sealed data on TPM 1.2. The TPM 2.0 introduces
flexible security policies [6], which allow an authorized user to issue updates to the security policy of a
TPM entity such as a sealed data blob or NVRAM
index. SABLE on TPM 2.0 will allow the SEC owner
to sign updated PCR values and produce an authorization ticket which can vouch for the validity of
the updated values. The TPM can then validate the
ticket, and approve an unseal operation for the new
PCR values.
Verification is also posing an additional challenge
for our effort to port SABLE to TPM 2.0. Our tentative redesign will no longer use TPM NVRAM to
store the SEC secrets. Instead, they will be passed in
encrypted form to SABLE as a boot module. Much of
the verification that we have completed for SABLE
on TPM 1.2 focused on the routines which handle
NVRAM storage. These proofs required roughly 50100 person hours to complete. None of these proofs
can be reused for our new implementation. Thus
from a formal verification standpoint—with manually written proofs—the cost of a design change is
very high.
We are also currently working to formally verify
SABLE’s heap allocator. This is being done as a separate and independent project [32], which could eventually be used by other trusted systems software. Our
goal is to first prove that, for a call to alloc() which
returns a non-null pointer, the returned pointer references a memory region which (a) is within the bounds
Theorem. SABLE’s implementation C refines its
of the heap, (b) does not overlap another live memory
abstract specification A:
region on the heap, and (c) is correctly aligned for the
type of the object(s) whose allocation was requested.
AvC
Our second goal is to build a separation logic-based
The TPM 1.2 specification [39] on which SABLE interface in Isabelle/HOL on top of the alloc() and
is currently based has been superseded by the TPM free() functions, as abstracted by AutoCorres. This
2.0 specification [42]. We are in the process of up- interface would allow a proof engineer to use a verifidating SABLE with a TPM 2.0 driver and new func- cation condition generator to automatically discharge
tionality to take advantage of the improved security proof goals involving calls to alloc() and free().
capabilities of TPM 2.0. One disadvantage of the
The effort to verify the heap allocator has already
SABLE design for TPM 1.2 is that the access control revealed two bugs in our implementation. Our forpolicy for the SEC secrets is extremely brittle. Any mula to convert bytes to heap blocks was suscepti13

ble to unsigned integer overflow. In this case, the
heap might allocate fewer bytes than what was requested by the caller. The second bug was a loop
termination condition which used a < instead of a <=
to compare two values. Consequently, alloc() could
allocate memory beyond the end of the heap.
One more feature we are currently working to implement is to allow SABLE to generate a full disk
encryption (FDE) key. This will allow SABLE to be
a secure loader in the most literal sense of the definition. With this extension, SABLE will use a combination of the pass phrase and a user counter sign
(another password) to generate the FDE key, e.g. using a standard cryptographic key derivation function.
Thus each SEC would guard a disk partition by encrypting it using the FDE key. The guarded partition
could only be unlocked by satisfying the security policy of the SEC through SABLE.
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References

Conclusion

In this paper we presented SABLE, a modern boot
loader designed to be secure and formally verifiable.
SABLE uses a bilateral attestation protocol between
the user and the TPM chip to establish mutual trust.
Our implementation can operate on both the AMD
SVM and Intel TXT architectures. SABLE was also
designed and implemented to be amenable to formal verification with the aid of a proof assistant, Isabelle/HOL. The constraints on program input mandated by the verification tool chain required us to
employ some unconventional strategies when we implemented SABLE. Finally, we discussed our divideand-conquer approach to verifying SABLE using a
technique to establish correspondence between an abstract model of SABLE and the C implementation of
SABLE. The verification effort is extremely labor intensive; we have completed several correspondence
proofs, and hope to complete the remainder of them
in the near future.
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